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Abstract 
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The past several years have seen numerous efforts to scale back or
eliminate affirmative action in postsecondary admissions. In response,
policymakers and postsecondary institutions in many states are searching
for ways to maintain the diversity of student populations without
resorting to a prohibited focus on race. In response to these changes, this
study used data from California and a simplified model of the University
of California admissions process to explore how various approaches to
admissions affect the diversity of the admitted student population.
"Race-neutral" admissions based solely on test scores and grades were
compared with the results of actual admissions before and after the
elimination of affirmative action. A final set of analyses explored the
effects on diversity of alternative approaches that take into account
factors other than grades and scores, but not race or ethnicity. Replacing
the former admissions process that included preferences with a
race-neutral model based solely on GPA and SAT-I scores substantially
reduced minority representation at the two most selective UC campuses
but had much smaller effects at the other six, less selective campuses.
SAT-I scores contributed to but were not the sole cause of the
underrepresentation of African American and Hispanic students. A
race-neutral model based solely on GPA also produced an
underrepresentation of minorities, albeit a less severe one. None of the
alternative admissions models analyzed could replicate the composition
of the student population that was in place before the termination of
affirmative action in California. The only approach that substantially
increased the representation of minority students was accepting most
students on the basis of within-school rather than statewide rankings, and
this approach caused a sizable drop in both the average SAT scores and
the average GPA of admitted applicants, particularly among African
American and Hispanic students. Although admissions systems differ,
the basic findings of this study are likely to apply at a general level to
many universities and underscore the difficulty of providing proportional
representation for underserved minority students at highly selective
institutions without explicit preferences.
 
Over the past several years, the use of affirmative action to increase the representation of
underserved minorities in postsecondary education has faced increasingly widespread
threats. Efforts to scale back or eliminate affirmative action in admissions have taken
numerous forms, including popular referenda, court decisions, and executive actions,
and have led to its elimination in California, Florida, and Washington. Affirmative
action was also terminated in Texas, although a recent court decision may permit its
reinstatement. A university affirmative action program recently survived legal challenge
in Michigan, but additional litigation is pending in other states, including cases on
appeal in Michigan and Georgia.
Faced with these events, policymakers and postsecondary institutions in many states are
searching for ways to maintain the diversity of student populations without resorting to a
prohibited focus on race. For example, several states are experimenting with what we
call "X% rules," in which the best students in each high school—that is, those who
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exceed a specified percentile in class rank—are guaranteed admission to a college
campus or system.
In response to these changes, we undertook to explore how various approaches to
admissions affect the diversity of the admitted student population. We examined the
effects of different stages in the admissions process—for example, the student's decision
to take a college-admissions test and to apply, and the college's decision to accept an
applicant—on the composition of the student population. In doing this, we focused not
only on race and ethnicity, but also on other aspects of diversity, such as the educational
background of accepted students. We modeled "race-neutral" admissions based solely on
test scores and grades and compared the results with actual admissions before and after
the elimination of affirmative action. Finally, we explored the effects on diversity of
alternative approaches that take into account factors other than grades and scores, but not
race or ethnicity.
Because California has been one of the primary focuses of debate about the rollback of
affirmative action, these analyses use data from that state and are loosely modeled after
the admissions procedures and student population of the University of California. We
expect that many of the findings could be generalized in broad brush to other states, but
some patterns may differ depending on differences among states in demographics, the
selectivity of state universities, and so on.
Recent Trends in Postsecondary Admissions
Although hard data on affirmative action are scanty, most observers believe that
selective institutions have widely employed it for several decades. The use of race as a
factor in higher education admissions was legitimized but limited by a 1978 Supreme
Court decision, University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke (1978). The justices
held that racial diversity was a legitimate goal for institutions of higher education but
that creating a separate admissions process or a quota system was not the "least
objectionable alternative" for achieving that goal. Consideration of race in the
admissions process was deemed acceptable only if it was one of many factors
considered.
The policies endorsing affirmative action have sometimes been explicit. An example is
the state system of higher education in Texas. Until 1996, the state of Texas maintained
a concerted effort to recruit minority students into higher education and to prepare its
institutions to meet the demands of its growing minority college-age population. This
effort was due to an investigation of segregation in Texas higher education by the U.S.
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) between 1978 and 1981. As a result of that investigation,
Texas was required to develop a plan to desegregate and to "increase the representation
of blacks and Hispanics in institutions of higher education" in order to avoid federal
enforcement proceedings (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 1997). Since
Governor William Clements issued the first plan, each subsequent governor has
submitted a follow-up designed to continue increasing minority representation in Texas
higher education. The most recent plan, Access and Equity 2000, sought increases
reflecting the proportion of college-age minorities in the Texas population as well as
increased minority representation on faculties and advisory boards. Similarly, until
affirmative action was terminated in California, the state of California engaged in
numerous activities to increase minority representation on campus, ranging from
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academic preparation programs at community colleges to actively recruiting minority
applicants to the campuses of the University of the California (UC).
Nonetheless, many of the admissions policies implementing affirmative action,
particularly at the institutional level, have not been made explicit, and their effect in
practice has often been unclear. As Kane noted, "Nearly two decades after the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1978 Bakke decision, we know little about the true extent of
affirmative action admissions by race or ethnicity…. Hard evidence has been difficult to
obtain, primarily because many colleges guard their admissions practices closely" (Kane,
1998a, p. 17).
  
One recent study used survey data to estimate the extent in practice of race-based
preferences in higher education admissions. Kane (1998b) estimated how race/ethnicity,
high school grade-point average (GPA), scores on the Scholastic Assessment Test
(SAT), participation in student government and athletics, and college selectivity affected
the probability of acceptance to college for a nationally representative sample of the high
school class of 1982. Kane found that, holding constant the factors other than race, black
and Hispanic applicants had an appreciable advantage over white applicants, but only in
selective colleges. In the most selective colleges (those in the top quintile of selectivity),
Kane estimated that the average advantage of black applicants was "equivalent to nearly
a full point increase in high school grade-point average (on a four-point scale), or to
several hundred points on the SAT" (Kane, 1998b, p. 438). The data upon which Kane's
estimates were based, however, are now quite dated, and the sample did not allow
estimates specific to states or individual postsecondary systems. Thus research leaves
unclear how substantial preferences were in the states that have been at the center of the
debate about the elimination of affirmative action, such as California and Texas.
Recent Policies Curtailing Group-Based Preferences
Although this report focuses on California, recent initiatives curtailing affirmative action
have been proposed or enacted in several states.
California
The first recent major rollback of affirmative action in higher education was the
enactment of SP‑1 in 1995 by the University of California Board of Regents. SP-1
stated that "the University of California shall not use race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity,
or national origin as criteria for admission to the University or to any program of study."
This resolution was a response to executive orders issued by Governor Pete Wilson that
severely curtailed affirmative action in a broad range of state procurement and
administrative decisions.
In November 1996, California voters approved Proposition 209, which eliminated the
consideration of race, ethnicity, and gender in public employment, public contracting,
and education. In effect, Proposition 209 provided constitutional backing for SP-1. The
US Supreme Court refused to hear a challenge to Proposition 209 in November 1997,
thus allowing the measure to stand. Admission decisions based on these new policies
went into effect with students seeking admission for the Spring quarter 1997-1998.
These actions, taken together, represent a full repeal of affirmative action policies in
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California's state system of higher education.
Texas
Around the same time, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ended the use of any
race-based consideration in admission decisions in the area under its jurisdiction. In
1992, four white students who had been denied entrance to the University of Texas law
school filed suit against the university, claiming that the partially race-based admission
process violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Four years later, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld their claims. "The case against race-based preferences does not
rest on the sterile assumption that American society is untouched or unaffected by the
tragic oppression of its past. Rather, it is the very enormity of that tragedy that lends
resolve to the desire never to repeat it, and find a legal order in which distinctions based
on race shall have no place" (Hopwood v. Texas, (1996), as quoted in Feinberg, 1998,
p.12).
The principle enunciated in Hopwood appears to be inconsistent with the standards
enforced by the OCR investigations of the state's efforts to remedy the remaining
vestiges of de jure segregation in public higher education. First in 1980 and again in
1987, the OCR found that Texas had not made adequate progress in eliminating such
problems and required that additional plans be adopted in order to avoid federal action.
Texas was informed by the OCR in 1997 (after the Hopwood ruling) that its higher
education system would once again be reviewed to ensure that an OCR-approved plan
had been effectively implemented and that all traces of segregation had been eliminated
in compliance with Supreme Court precedent (Siegel, 1998). The standard for the OCR
review was set by United States v. Fordice, a 1992 case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held "that any state with a history of segregation in higher education must
implement affirmative measures, including racial preferences to eliminate those
vestiges." This standard differs from the one set out in Hopwood, which allows the use
of racial preferences, but only when a state entity is acting to remedy present effects of
past discrimination at a specific institution (THECB, 1997). The OCR review is still in
progress and it is uncertain how OCR standard in Fordice may affect the interpretation 
or implementation of Hopwood.
The Hopwood case has been returned to the Court of Appeals three times, and the most
recent ruling suggests that race may play some role in admissions. In its most recent
ruling, the Court of Appeals did not overturn the original Hopwood ruling, but it did rule
that the District Court injunction prohibiting the University of Texas Law School from
any use of race in making admissions decisions was overly broad and excessive. The
case has been remanded again to Circuit Court for additional action. The degree to
which racial preferences will be allowable in Texas and in other states under the
jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit therefore remains uncertain.
Washington
Initiative 200 (I-200) was passed by the voters of Washington state in November 1998.
Like Proposition 209 in California, it restricts the use of race in employment, education,
and contracting. In response to the initiative, University of Washington (UW) President
Richard L. McCormick announced that UW would suspend the use of race, ethnicity,
and gender in admissions beginning in Spring 1999. It is important to note, however,
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that I-200 was passed as a law, not as an amendment to the state constitution as was
Proposition 209 in California. It is therefore still uncertain whether I-200 will supersede
existing laws that allow the use of race in employment and contracting decisions. It does
not, for example, apply to federally funded state programs that must comply with federal
nondiscrimination laws.
Florida
The Board of Regents of the State University System of Florida voted in favor of
Governor Jeb Bush's "One Florida" Initiative in February 2000. This plan eliminates the
use of race as a factor in admission decisions in the Florida University system and
outlines an alternative, race-neutral admission process. Florida planned to have its new
admission criteria in effect for students graduating from high school in 2000.
Georgia
In Georgia, a case was filed in federal court by three white women denied admission to
the University of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the University and State Board of Regents
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that they were discriminated
against because of their race. In a decision handed down in July of 2000, federal judge
B. Avant Edenfield of Georgia ruled that the 1978 Bakke decision has been
misinterpreted and that diversity is "an amorphous, unquantifiable goal" that cannot be
constitutionally justified. He nullified the University of Georgia's now-discarded policy
of maintaining lower admission standards for blacks. In a non-binding opinion, he
further criticized the university's use of race/ethnicity as a "plus" factor in the selection
of 10 to 15% of the students in each year's entering class. The case is likely to be
appealed to the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Denniston, 2000).
Michigan
Michigan has recently seen two challenges to affirmative action in higher education in
federal court. The first, Gratz v. Bollinger et. Al (2000), challenged the use of race in 
admissions at the undergraduate level. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful applicants to the
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts in Fall 1995 and Fall 1997, respectively.
This case was recently decided in favor of the defendant. Grutter v. Bollinger (2001) 
was filed in 1997 against the University of Michigan's law school, challenging the use of
race in its admission policy. In March, 2001, District Court Judge Bernard Friedman
ruled that the law school's admissions policies considering race were unconstitutional
and a violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Both cases have been certified
as class actions and are expected to be appealed.
Policy Responses to Challenges to Affirmative Action
Policymakers in the university systems of Texas, California, and Florida have tried in
various ways to maintain diversity in the face of legal restrictions on affirmative action.
In all three states, individual campuses have tried to recruit at high schools whose
students are traditionally underrepresented in the college population. At the system level,
outreach in California and Texas has focused on informing the public about the
race-neutral admissions policies and on assuring minorities that the higher education
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system is still hospitable.
All three of these states have also instituted "X% plans"—that is, policies that admit a
certain percentage of graduating public high school seniors automatically to their
university systems, primarily on the basis of students' academic ranks within their high
schools. The Texas legislature passed House Bill No. 588, also known as the 10% rule,
in May of 1997. The measure mandates that public or private high school students
whose GPA places them in the top 10% of their graduating class be admitted
automatically to "each general academic teaching institution" if they graduated within
the previous two years and filed the appropriate applications on time. The act also
stipulates that the governing board of each such institution will decide on an institutional
basis whether to automatically admit any student in the top 25% of his or her graduating
class, but not in the top 10%. The legislature also outlined factors other than academic
achievement that institutions were to take into consideration when admitting the rest of
their freshman classes—factors related primarily to socioeconomic status, geographic
region, and uncommon hardship. The admission criteria for students not in the top 10%
or 25% of their class were to be published in the academic catalogs and made available
to the public not later than one year before the date when they were to take effect.
Similarly, the factors used in awarding competitive fellowships and scholarships were to
be made public. The act has applied to all admissions and scholarship awards since the
Fall semester of 1998.
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In California, the top 4% of graduating seniors from each public high school are now
eligible for admission to a school in the UC system, although not necessarily to the
campus of their choice. Each school sets its own admission standards based on system
policies, but a student deemed eligible is guaranteed admission to at least one of the UC
campuses. The 4% plan in California has been termed ELC, eligibility in the local
context. In addition to graduating in the top 4% of their class, students must fulfill a
minimum course requirement that specifies the number and level of courses to be taken
in high school subject areas, and they must submit ACT or SAT scores if the institution
of their choice requires test scores. The ELC 4% plan is expected to be in effect for
freshmen applicants in Fall 2001.
Unlike Texas and California, Florida established an alternative policy concurrently with
terminating of race-based admissions. Beginning with the class of 2000, the top 20% of
graduating seniors from each public high school will automatically be admitted to the
state university system under the Talented 20 Program. Because of enrollment caps,
however, students are guaranteed admission only to one of the 10 Florida universities,
not necessarily to their top choice. The "One Florida" plan also calls for an additional
$20 million in need-based financial aid. Under this initiative, universities are asked to
address the financial-aid needs of students admitted under the Talented 20 Program
before those of other students.
Washington state is in the process of reviewing its policies in response to Initiative 200.
The UW Board of Regents is considering a proposal to allow the use of race and gender
as factors in choosing the recipients of privately funded scholarships. Applicants would
undergo screening based on neutral factors such as merit and need. From among those
who pass the screen, students would be matched with scholarships. The aim is to attract
minority students to the UW system.
Initial Effects of Policy Responses
Only Texas has fully implemented its "X% rule" admission policy. Holley and Spencer
(1999) found that in its first year, the 10% rule had no significant impact on the number
of minority students enrolled as first-time freshmen at the University of Texas at Austin
and Texas A&M University, the state's two flagship schools. Only eight more black
students and one fewer Hispanic student enrolled at UT-Austin in 1998 than in 1997. At
A&M, 19 more black students and 62 more Hispanic students enrolled in 1998.
However, the results of the 10% rule were available only for the first year (academic
year 1998) and may not be indicative of the long-term effects of the new program.
Although no data on the effects of the 4% rule on freshman enrollment patterns at the
University of California schools are available, a simulation study assessing the potential
effects was conducted by Saul Geiser of the UC Office of the President.1For all
California public high-school graduates for whom SAT scores were available, Geiser
(1998) calculated an Academic Index score—an 8,000-point scale that gives
approximately equal weight to a student's high school GPA and SAT scores. Students
were then ranked by Academic Index score within each high school, and those in several
top percentiles were combined into a simulated UC eligibility pool. Geiser found that
limiting admissions to only the top 4% of students within each high school would have a
modest impact on the racial/ethnic composition of the admitted population. Of the total
eligible pool, 31% would be white, 47% Asian, 14% Latino, 3% black, and 5% "other."
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In the second stage, the three models chosen in the first stage were applied to the
College Board data to estimate the racial/ethnic composition of the admitted pool under
race-neutral admissions rules. These analyses used 1998 and 1995 data and were limited
to students who attended high school in California at the time they took the SAT. The
models did not predict acceptance or rejection for individual students; rather, they
predicted the probability of admission for students in a given range of SAT scores and
GPA. These probabilities were applied to counts of tested students in each range to
obtain estimated counts of admitted students. The resulting estimates of racial/ethnic
composition were compared with actual admission data from the class admitted in 1999
(after SP-1 and Proposition 209 had been implemented) to confirm their reasonableness.
The application and acceptance process in the UC system can be seen as a sequence of
filters, which are described in the following section: (1) taking the SAT; (2) meeting the
UC system eligibility criteria, based on SAT scores and GPA; (3) applying to a campus
at a given level of selectivity; and (4) being admitted to that campus. Our models
represented a simplified, race-neutral version of the fourth of these filters. We examined
the effects of the four filters, individually and in various combinations, on the diversity
of the surviving pool of students. For example, by removing the application filter, we
estimated the racial/ethnic composition that would result if all students were successfully
encouraged to apply to campuses at all three levels of selectivity. We also examined the
effects of these filters on other characteristics of the admitted groups: whether high
school students attended an urban, suburban, or rural high school, the type of high
school attended (e.g., public, private, religiously affiliated), parents' level of education,
and first language spoken at home. The results of these analyses were compared with
actual admission data from three years: 1995 (to represent policy before the enactment of
SP-1 and Proposition 209), 1999 (to represent full implementation of these policies), and
1997 (to represent the transitional period).
In the third stage, a number of alternative admission models were applied to gauge their
effects on the diversity of the admitted student population. These models used both
individual variables (such as parents' education) and school characteristics (such as the
percentage of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch). As part of this stage, we
replicated the analyses performed by the UC office of the President to model the effects
of 4%, 6% and 12.5% admission policies to ensure that our data and methods were
consistent with those used in that study.
Steps in the Selection Process
The selection process entails a series of filters that progressively winnow the applicant
pool. The filters in our models are the following.
The decision to take the SAT (or ACT). Because admission to the University of
California system requires that students take the SAT or ACT, those who fail to do so
remove themselves from the pool of potential students. This filter is nearly universal
among selective colleges and universities nationwide, although a few institutions (e.g.,
Bates and Bowdoin) either do not use it or make the submission of scores optional.
In California, 98% of students who apply to the University of California take the SAT
(Geiser, 1998), and our models accordingly simplified this filter slightly by considering
only whether students take the SAT, not either the SAT or the ACT.
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University system eligibility. The University of California screens students for eligibility
to the entire UC system. Ineligible students are for the most part ineligible for admission
to any of the eight campuses. However, at the outset of the study period, each campus
was allowed to allocate up to 6% of its slots to UC-ineligible students, and up to
two-thirds of these slots could be used for admitting disadvantaged students (1996 
Guidelines for Implementation of University Policy on Undergraduate Admissions,
http://www.ucop.edu/sas/exguides.html).
UC system eligibility was based on three criteria. First, GPA and SAT-I scores were
combined on a sliding scale to set minimum requirements. (SAT-I refers to the basic
verbal and mathematics tests, while SAT-II refers to a number of optional,
subject-matter tests.) For example, students with GPAs of at least 3.29 were UC-eligible
as long as their combined SAT-I scores were at least 570, while students with GPAs of
3.0 were required to have a combined SAT-I score of at least 1270. Second, students
were required to take a set of required courses. Third, students had to take three SAT-II
tests, "including writing, mathematics Level 1 or Level 2, and one test in one of the
following areas: English literature, foreign language, science, or social studies," although
they were not required to attain a specific score on these tests (Admission as a 
Freshman, http://www.ucop.edu/pathways/impinfo/freshx.html).
Our models simplified system eligibility by applying the UC GPA and SAT-I criteria but
not the UC requirements for specific courses or for taking SAT-II tests. Because the
system-eligibility filter is specific to the University of California system, we conducted
parallel analyses that excluded it.
Application to a campus at a given level of selectivity. Students who elect not to apply to
an institution remove themselves from the pool of potential students. We lacked data on
actual applications, but we did have a record of all institutions to which each student had
his or her SAT-I scores sent. We treated sending a score as a proxy for application, thus
overestimating by a presumably small amount the actual number of applications. We
established a flag indicating whether a student had sent scores to any of the campuses 
within three levels of selectivity (see Appendix A):
High selectivity: Berkeley and UCLA
Moderate selectivity: Irvine, Davis, Santa Barbara, and San Diego
Low selectivity: Santa Cruz and Riverside.
Predicted admission based on GPA and SAT. The probability that each student will be
accepted to a campus at a given level of selectivity was predicted using logistic
regression models derived from published campus-level admission statistics (see
Appendix A).2 We refer to this as a race-neutral admissions model because the
probabilities assigned to students were unaffected by race or ethnicity (or any
characteristics other than SAT scores and GPA). These models could not predict
admission or rejection for individual students; rather, they predicted the probability of
admission for students within a given range of GPA and SAT-I scores. These
probabilities were multiplied by the number of students in each range to yield a count of
"admitted" students.
Limitations
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This study is limited to students who attended high school in California and who took
the SAT, and it examines only the impact of race-neutral admission decisions to
University of California campuses. Analyses in other states might yield substantially
different results. Because this study sorts campuses into three categories and uses one
model from one campus within each category to represent all campuses in that category,
the findings do not necessarily apply to individual campuses. Moreover, this study is
based almost entirely on data collected during the late 1990s, and patterns of application,
test-taking, and acceptance may change with time. Nonetheless, we expect that the
findings generalize in broad stroke to numerous other state university systems.
This study was also limited by the type of data to which we had access. For example, we
had no access to individual-level data about acceptance or rejection, and the aggregate
data on admissions probabilities were not available separately by race/ethnicity. That
lack precluded more refined and powerful analysis.
The Effects of Current and Race-Neutral Selection on Racial/Ethnic
Composition
Estimates of the effects of selection policies on diversity are presented by the selectivity
of the institutions, starting with the most highly selective.
Effects in Highly Selective Institutions
Admissions to highly selective institutions were modeled loosely on UCLA and
Berkeley. As noted, while the application filter showed whether students applied to
either of these two campuses, the regression model used for both was derived from
Berkeley data. Use of the UCLA data would not have greatly changed the results (see
Appendix A).
The first screen applied, students' decision whether to take the SAT, substantially
decreased the percentage of Hispanic students and increased the percentage of Asian
students. In 1998, 31% of California high school graduates, but only 19% of those taking
the SAT, were Hispanic (Table 1). Conversely, 15% of graduates but 23% of SAT-takers
were Asian. This screen, however, only slightly reduced the representation of black
students, who constituted roughly 7% of both graduates and SAT-takers. The decision to
take the SAT also slightly reduced the representation of white students, who constituted
45% of graduates and 42% of SAT-takers.
It is important to note, however, that eliminating this screen—that is, having all students
take the SAT—would not fully eliminate its effects. The students who decide against
taking the SAT are presumably lower-achieving on average than those who do take it.
Thus if all students took the SAT, many of those who currently do not take it would fail
to gain admission because of low scores; and if the SAT were no longer used in
admissions, some would fail to gain admission because of weaker academic records.
The UC system eligibility screen had a very different effect: it reduced the percentage of
black students substantially and the percentage of Hispanic students more modestly. In
1998, 7% of California students taking the SAT were black, in contrast to 4% of those
system-eligible in terms of SAT scores and GPA (see italicized panel of Table 1.)
Hispanics constituted 19% of all SAT-takers but 15% of those eligible. Applying the
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eligibility screen slightly increased the representation of whites and Asians.
Table 1
Racial/Ethnic Composition, Highly Selective Campuses:
Actual, and Estimated Using All Screens and SAT+GPA Admissions
Model
Asian,
Asian-American, 
Pacific Islander
Black or
African-American
Hispanic White Other Decline
to State
Graduates, 1998 15 7 31 45 1 NA
SAT-takers,
1998
22 7 19 42 6 3
UC eligible,
1998
25 4 15 46 6 3
Eligible and 
applied to
high-selectivity 
school, 1998
36 4 15 35 7 2
Admitted by 
neutral model,
1998
38 2 9 42 7 3
1995 Admitted
class
36 7 19 31 2 5
1997 Admitted
class
38 6 15 33 2 6
1999 Admitted
class
41 3 10 35 2 9
Note: Race/ethnicity is based on student self-reports for all rows except the "Graduates" row,
which is based on reports by school administrators. Estimates are italicized; other numbers are
actual counts. Percentages may not sum to totals because of the exclusion of American Indian
students and rounding. 
Sources: Estimates reflect NBETPP analysis; admission figures are published figures from UC
(http://www.ucop.edu/pathways/infoctr/introuc/prof_engin.html); counts of SAT-takers are based
on NBETPP tabulations of data provided by the College Board; counts of graduates are from
California Department of Education, Educational Demographics Unit
(http://data1.cde.gov/dataquest). 
Using the application screen—that is, dropping all students who did not apply to
Berkeley or UCLA—did not affect the representation of Hispanics or blacks ("Eligible
and applied to high selectivity school" row of Table 1). The number of minority students 
dropped by nearly half when this filter was applied, but that decrease was similar to the
decrease in the total number of students in the pool. The application filter did, however,
increase the percentage of Asian students and decrease the percentage of whites.
Assuming that most of the students who requested that scores be sent to a particular
campus actually applied for admission to that campus, it appears that Asians are
particularly likely and whites less likely to apply to Berkeley and UCLA.
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The final screen, the race-neutral admissions function based only on SAT and GPA,
markedly reduced the representation of Hispanics and more still that of blacks. Black
students dropped from 4% to 2% of the pool at this stage (see "Admitted by neutral
model" row of Table 1), while Hispanics dropped from 15% to 9%. The offsetting
increase was among white students, not Asians.
These screens have a cumulative effect, progressively reducing the representation of
Hispanic and black students in the pool. That effect for Hispanics can be seen in Figure 1,
which graphically represents the percentages in Table 1. The second bar shows a dramatic
reduction from all graduates to those who took the SAT. The next screen, UC eligibility
(simplified, as noted earlier, to reflect only SAT scores and GPA), produced a more
modest but still appreciable drop. Application to high-selectivity schools had no effect on
the representation of Hispanics, but the race-neutral admissions model reduced it
substantially.
Figure 1. Hispanics as Percentage of Group Admitted, Highly Selective Campuses
SOURCES: See Note, Table 1. 
In 1995, before the implementation of SP-1 or Proposition 209, Hispanics constituted
19% of students admitted to Berkeley and UCLA, which was almost exactly equal to
their representation in the population of SAT-takers (Figure 1). Hispanics were thus
overrepresented slightly relative to their numbers among UC-eligible students and
substantially relative to a race-neutral policy. By 1999, after SP-1 and Proposition 209
were implemented, the representation of Hispanics admitted at these two campuses fell to
roughly the percentage predicted by our race-neutral model. As Karabel (1998) noted, the
admission of minorities fell after the enactment but before the implementation of SP-1
and Proposition 209 (note the drop between 1995 and 1997 in Figure 1).
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The cumulative effects of these admissions screens on blacks present a somewhat
different picture. While the sharpest drops in the representation of Hispanics arose from
self-selection to take the SAT and the use of a race-neutral model, the declines for blacks
arose primarily from the UC system eligibility screen and the race-neutral model (Figure
2). In 1995, blacks constituted 7% of students admitted to Berkeley or UCLA, almost
exactly matching their representation among SAT-takers and high school graduates
(Figure 2). Their representation among students actually admitted to Berkeley or UCLA,
like that of Hispanics, dropped in both 1997 and 1999. Their representation among actual
admissions in 1999, however, while very low, was substantially higher than was
predicted by our simple GPA- and SAT-based race-neutral admissions model.
Figure 2. Blacks as Percentage of Group Admitted, Highly Selective Campuses
SOURCES: See Note, Table 1. 
Our model did not match as well the representation of Asian and white students in the
admitted pool. In 1999, 41% of the students admitted to Berkeley or UCLA were Asian,
and 35% were white. Our race-neutral model predicted slightly fewer Asians (38%) and
appreciably more whites (42%) than were actually admitted. We suspect but cannot verify
that this is due to differences in the proportions of white and Asian students applying to
selective private institutions in California and to colleges outside the state.
Because most states lack the system-eligibility screen used in California, we tested the
generality of these findings. We applied the race-neutral admissions model based on SAT
scores and GPA to all students who had sought admission to either UCLA or Berkeley
and eliminated the UC system eligibility screen. Dropping that screen had almost no
effect on the racial/ethnic composition of the group "admitted by neutral model"
presented in Table 1. Recall that our simplified system eligibility rule is based solely on
SAT scores and GPA, and the admissions model for the highly selective campuses
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applies such stringent requirements for those scores that the system eligibility screen is
simply irrelevant.
In principle, one simple way to address the underrepresentation of minority students
would be to encourage all students to apply to the highly selective campuses. Therefore,
in a second simplification, we applied the race-neutral admissions model to all students
who took the SAT, regardless of system eligibility and of the schools to which they had
their SAT scores sent. This too affected the racial/ethnic composition of the "admitted"
pool only slightly. The total number of "admitted" students went up by more than half;
the increases in the numbers of "admitted" blacks and Hispanics, however, were roughly
proportional to that overall increase.
Some observers have argued that admissions tests such as the SAT should be abandoned
in order to produce a student body more nearly representative of the racial/ethnic
composition of the entire population. For example, in 1997, a university task force
recommended that the University of California drop the SAT as an admission
requirement to avoid a precipitous decline in the enrollment of minorities at the
university's flagship campuses (Fletcher, 1997). Thus we estimated a second set of
race-neutral models, based solely on GPA with no consideration of SAT, to explore how
that criterion would affect the diversity of the accepted student population. (See
Appendix A.)
A race-neutral model based solely on GPA creates a substantial underrepresentation of
both black and Hispanic students, though a somewhat less severe one than that generated
by the race-neutral model based on SAT and GPA together. This is shown in Table 2,
which presents the racial/ethnic composition of the groups admitted by the SAT+GPA
and GPA-only models. The second panel in Table 2, "SAT+GPA," presents estimates
(discussed earlier) based on the SAT+GPA race-neutral model.3 For example, using the
SAT+GPA model with students who applied to either Berkeley or UCLA, 9% of those
"admitted" would be Hispanic. In contrast, 13% of students selected by the GPA-only
model would be Hispanic (third panel of Table 2). Thus the GPA-only model increased
by roughly half the percentage of admitted students who are Hispanic; but even with this
model, Hispanics were substantially underrepresented relative to the 31% of graduates
and 19% of SAT-takers who were Hispanic. Similarly, using a GPA-only model
increased the percentage of the admitted group who are black by about half, but would
still admit less than half as many blacks as there were either among graduates or among
SAT-takers.
Table 2
Racial/Ethnic Composition, Highly Selective Campuses, Estimated
Using SAT+GPA and GPA-Only Admissions Models
Asian,
Asian-American, 
Pacific Islander
Black or
African-American
Hispanic White Other Decline
to State
Graduates,
1998
15 7 31 45 1 NA
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SAT-takers,
1998
22 7 19 42 6 3
SAT+GPA
Applied and
admitted
38 2 9 42 7 3
GPA only
Applied and
admitted
36 3 13 37 7 2
Note: Race/ethnicity is based on student self-reports for all rows except the "Graduates" row, which
is based on reports by school administrators. Estimates are italicized; other numbers are actual
counts. Percentages may not sum to totals because of the exclusion of American Indian students and
rounding. 
Sources: Estimates reflect NBETPP analysis; admission figures are published figures from UC
(http://www.ucop.edu/pathways/infoctr/introuc/prof_engin.html); counts of SAT-takers are based
on NBETPP tabulations of data provided by the College Board; counts of graduates are from
California Department of Education, Educational Demographics Unit
(http://data1.cde.gov/dataquest). 
The improved representation of minority students achieved by using a GPA-only model
rather than a GPA+SAT model, however, would come at a price. Grading standards are
inconsistent from high school to high school, and there is evidence that they vary across
types of school. For example, grading tends to be more lenient in schools with high
poverty rates (U.S. Department of Education, 1994). Absent a measure standardized
across schools, these inconsistencies would introduce additional arbitrariness into the
admission process and could lower the overall level of academic preparedness of the
admitted group.
Effects in Moderately Selective Institutions
We classified as moderately selective the campuses at Irvine, Davis, Santa Barbara, and
San Diego. Our race-neutral admissions model for these campuses was based on data
from Irvine.
The first two screens applied in examining admissions to moderately selective institutions
were the same as for highly selective schools—that is, deciding to take the SAT and
meeting UC system eligibility requirements. Thus, the representation of non-Asian
minority students fell substantially before use of the filter of application to a moderately
selective campus: Hispanic representation was reduced by the SAT-taking screen, and
black representation by the UC system eligibility screen.
Although the self-selection of eligible students to apply to moderately selective campuses
reduced the pool by about 40%, it affected the racial/ethnic composition of the pool only
modestly (Table 3). Hispanic students constituted 15% of the eligible pool but 13 % of
the eligible students who applied to such an institution. Black students, who constituted a
meager 4% of eligible students, made up only 3% of those who were eligible and applied.
The representation of Asian-American students increased appreciably with this filter, and
the representation of whites dropped.
Table 3
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Racial/Ethnic Composition, Moderately Selective Campuses: Actual,
and Estimated Using All Screens and SAT+GPA Admissions Model
Asian,
Asian-American, 
Pacific Islander
Black or
African-American
Hispanic White Other Decline
to State
Graduates,
1998
15 7 31 45 1 NA
SAT-takers,
1998
22 7 19 42 6 3
UC eligible,
1998
25 4 15 46 6 3
Eligible and 
applied to
moderately 
selective 
school, 1998
32 3 13 42 6 2
Admitted by 
neutral model,
1998
33 2 12 43 7 2
1995 Admitted
class
35 3 14 42 4 2
1997 Admitted
class
36 3 13 44 3 5
1999 Admitted
class
36 2 11 41 2 8
Note 1: Race/ethnicity is based on student self-reports for all rows except the "Graduates" row,
which is based on reports by school administrators. Estimates are italicized; other numbers are
actual counts. Percentages may not sum to totals because of the exclusion of American Indian
students and rounding. 
Note 2: An earlier version of this table was corrected on January 17, 2002. 
Sources: Estimates reflect NBETPP analysis; admission figures are published figures from UC
(http://www.ucop.edu/pathways/infoctr/introuc/prof_engin.html); counts of SAT-takers are based
on NBETPP tabulations of data provided by the College Board; counts of graduates are from
California Department of Education, Educational Demographics Unit
(http://data1.cde.gov/dataquest). 
When used with UC-eligible students who applied to one of the four moderately selective
institutions, the race-neutral admissions model had little effect on the racial/ethnic
composition of the student pool. The number of students fell by roughly one-fourth with
use of the admissions model, but the reduction was nearly proportional to the
racial/ethnic groups. The percentage of Hispanics decreased only from 13% to 12%; that
of blacks dropped from 2.6% to 2.2 %.
For moderately selective campuses as well, our models suggest that by 1999 admissions
in all four campuses taken together were largely race-neutral. The composition of the
group admitted in 1999 was very similar to that predicted by our race-neutral model
(Table 3; compare the "Admitted by neutral model" row with the actual figures for 1999
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admissions).
However, at the moderate-selectivity campuses taken together—in contrast to the highly
selective campuses—the composition of the classes admitted changed only modestly
from 1995 to 1999. Between 1997 and 1999, the percentage of admitted students who
were black declined from 3% to 2%, and the percentage who were Hispanic from 14% to
11% (Table 3). These small changes after affirmative action was terminated suggest that
racial/ethnic preferences had been much less substantial at the moderately selective
campuses, taken together, than at the highly selective campuses.
We again examined the effects of removing the UC eligibility requirements and the
application screen. Removing the former only slightly increased the size of the pool of
students, and had only trivial effects on the ethnic composition of the accepted student
group. In other words, for the most part students who were not UC system eligible either
did not apply to any of these colleges or were predicted to be rejected by our admissions
model. This was due mainly to students who took the SAT but did not apply to any of
the four institutions. Removing the application screen—in effect, having all students
who took the SAT apply—increased the number of students "accepted" by more than
half. This increase, however, was roughly proportional to racial/ethnic groups, and so
would raise the percentage of students who were black or Hispanic only slightly.
Effects in the Least Selective Institutions
In many respects, admission to the least and the moderately selective UC campuses was
similar. In both cases, the main reduction in the representation of Hispanics occurred
though the self-selection of students to take the SAT (Table 4). The UC system
eligibility screen brought a modest further reduction, but the application screen and the
race-neutral model had little effect. In contrast, blacks were proportionately represented
among SAT-takers, and the primary reduction in the representation resulted from the
application of the UC eligibility screen.
Table 4
Racial/Ethnic Composition, Least Selective Campuses: Actual, and
Estimated Using all Screens and SAT+GPA Admissions Model
Asian,
Asian-American, 
Pacific Islander
Black or
African-American
Hispanic White Other Decline
to State
Graduates,
1998
15 7 31 45 1 NA
SAT-takers,
1998
22 7 19 42 6 3
UC eligible,
1998
25 4 15 46 6 3
Eligible and 
applied to
low-selectivity 
school, 1998
33 3 16 38 7 2
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Admitted by 
neutral model,
1998
33 3 15 39 7 3
1995 Admitted
class
32 4 19 38 4 2
1997 Admitted
class
35 3 15 39 3 5
1999 Admitted
class
33 3 15 39 2 7
Note: Race/ethnicity is based on student self-reports for all rows except the "Graduates" row,
which is based on reports by school administrators. Estimates are italicized; other numbers are
actual counts. Percentages may not sum to totals because of the exclusion of American Indian
students and rounding. 
Sources: Estimates reflect NBETPP analysis; admission figures are published figures from UC
(http://www.ucop.edu/pathways/infoctr/introuc/prof_engin.html); counts of SAT-takers are based
on NBETPP tabulations of data provided by the College Board; counts of graduates are from
California Department of Education, Educational Demographics Unit
(http://data1.cde.gov/dataquest). 
Admission of black and Hispanic students to the least selective campuses changed little
from 1995 to 1999 and matched our race-neutral model reasonably closely in all years.
This suggests that students' preferences played little role in admission to these
institutions.
The Effects of Admission Filters and Race-Neutral Selection on Other
Aspects of Diversity
The diversity of the student body has numerous aspects in addition to race and ethnicity.
In this section, we examine the effect of each filter in the admission process on other
aspects of diversity: the geographic location and type of the secondary schools students
attended, the education level of students' parents, and the languages students speak at
home.
Information on these variables was obtained from the Student Descriptive Questionnaire
(SDQ) that students complete when registering for the SAT and thus is subject to the
errors common to survey data of this sort. For example, students may not consistently
characterize the language used in their homes. Because the effects on racial/ethnic
diversity are largest at the highly selective campuses, these analyses are limited to them.
Geographic Location
The SDQ offers six options for classifying the location of students' high schools: large
city, medium city, small city, suburban, rural, and other. In 1998, 30% of SAT takers in
California reported attending a secondary school located in a large city, and 60% in
cities of all sizes (Table 5).4 Thirty percent attended school in a suburban area, and only
5% in a rural area.
Table 5
Geographic Composition, Highly Selective Campuses, Using System
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Eligibility, Application, and SAT+GPA Admissions Model
Large
City
Medium
City
Small
City
Suburban Rural Other
SAT-takers, 1998 30 16 14 30 5 5
UC Eligible, 1998 28 17 15 32 6 3
Eligible and applied to
high-selectivity schools, 1998
32 16 12 35 3 2
Admitted by neutral model, 1998 28 16 12 40 3 1
Although the effects of the application filters on geographic representation are modest
compared with those on racial/ethnic composition, they do somewhat increase the
percentage of students who are from suburban schools. All three filters—UC system
eligibility, application to a highly selective campus, and predicted
admission—contribute to this effect; taken together, they increased the representation of
suburban students from 30% of all SAT-takers to 40% of those admitted by a
race-neutral model (Table 5). This increase was offset by smaller decreases in the
percentages from schools in other locations. Surprisingly, the admission filter had only
very small and inconsistent effects on the representation of students from large cities.
School Type
The SDQ allowed students to specify four types of high school: public school,
religiously affiliated school, independent school without religious affiliation, and other.
Of California students who took the SAT in 1998, 81% attended a public school, 13%
attended religiously affiliated schools, 2% attended a non-religious independent school,
and 4% attended alternative types of school (Table 6).
Table 6
School Type, Highly Selective Campuses, Using System Eligibility,
Application, and SAT+GPA Admission Model
Public Independent Religious Other
SAT-takers, 1998 81 2 13 4
UC Eligible, 1998 82 3 13 3
Eligible and applied to high-selectivity schools,
1998
83 3 13 1
Admitted by neutral model, 1998 83 4 12 1
The effects of the admission filters on the mix of school types were minor. At all stages
of selection, between 81% and 83% of students were from public schools, and 12% or
13% were from religious schools (Table 6). The filters reduced the representation of
students from "other" schools and increased that of students from non-religious
independent schools, but both of these groups constituted only a small percentage of the
total group at each stage.
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Parents' Education
Students were asked to report the highest education level attained by their fathers and
mothers. The SDQ offered the following response options: grade school, some high
school, high school diploma, business school, some college, associate's degree, BA
degree, some graduate school, and graduate degree. We collapsed these nine categories
into five:
No high school diploma;
High school diploma;
Some higher education;
College degree (BA degree);
Beyond BA.
Each of the filters increased the representation of students whose parents had at least a
bachelor's degree. The three filters taken together increased the representation of
children of college-educated mothers by 50% or more (Table 7). For example, 18% of
SAT-takers but 30% of "admitted" students had mothers with more than a BA degree.
The two categories of mothers with a BA or beyond were roughly of equal size and
showed approximately the same effects. While all three screens contributed to this
pattern, use of the race-neutral admissions model had the largest effect. These increases
were offset by decreases in the representation of children of the three categories of
less-educated mothers, with proportionately the greatest reduction occurring for children
of mothers with no high school diploma.
Table 7
Mother's Education, Highly Selective Campuses, Using System
Eligibility, Application, and SAT+GPA Admissions Model
No HS
Diploma
HS
Diploma
Some
Higher Ed
BA
Degree
Beyond
BA
SAT-takers, 1998 14 16 34 19 18
UC Eligible, 1998 11 14 32 21 21
Eligible and applied to
high-selectivity schools, 1998
12 13 28 23 23
Admitted by neutral model,
1998
6 11 25 28 30
The same general pattern appeared with fathers' education, for students who reported
that as well, although some specific effects were different. The admission
filters—particularly the race-neutral admission model—had more impact on the
representation of children whose fathers had post-graduate education. Students who
reported that their fathers had more than a BA constituted 24% of all SAT-takers but
43% of "admitted" students (Table 8).
Table 8
Father's Education, Highly Selective Campuses, Using System
22 of 39
Eligibility, Application, and SAT+GPA Admissions Model
No HS
Diploma
HS
Diploma
Some
Higher Ed
BA
Degree
Beyond
BA
SAT-takers, 1998 13 14 28 20 24
UC Eligible, 1998 11 12 26 22 29
Eligible and applied to
high, 1998
11 10 22 23 33
Admitted by neutral
model, 1998
6 7 19 25 43
Home Language
Students responding to the SDQ were given three options for describing the first
language they speak at home: only English, English and another language, and another
language. As Table 9 indicates, most students who took the SAT in 1998 spoke only
English at home; 21% of the SAT takers primarily spoke a language other than English;
and 16% spoke a combination of English and another language.
The effects of the admission filters on the representation of these three groups were
inconsistent. For example, use of the UC system eligibility filter slightly decreased the
representation of students who speak other languages at home, from 21% to 19%; use of
the application filter increased their representation to 25%; and use of the race-neutral
admission model reduced it again to precisely the level—21%—shown among all
SAT-takers (Table 9). We suspect that these effects stem from the fact that the
categories "English and other language" and "another language" include some of the
Asian students who are overrepresented at the most selective UC campuses.
Table 9
Representation of Home Languages, Highly Selective Campuses, Using
System Eligibility, Application, and SAT+GPA Admission Model
English Only English &
Other Language
Another Language
SAT-takers, 1998 63 16 21
UC Eligible, 1998 65 16 19
Eligible and applied to high, 1998 54 21 25
Admitted by neutral model, 1998 59 20 21
The Effects of Alternative Selection Models on Diversity
The "X%" policies adopted by California, Texas, and Florida are intended to capitalize
on the unequal distribution of low-scoring minority students among high schools in
order to increase the representation of racial/ethnic minorities in the pool of admitted
students. An alternative approach to that end is to give weight to other demographic
variables that may act as a proxy for race/ethnicity. In this section, the effects of both
23 of 39
approaches are examined.
Top X % Policies and Other Aspects of Diversity
As summarized above, Geiser (1998) simulated the impact four different X% policies
would have on both the racial/ethnic composition and on the average academic
preparedness of groups admitted to the University of California. Here, we examine the
effect of these policies on other measures of ethnic diversity as well. Unlike Geiser
(1998), however, we ranked students solely on their GPAs, an approach that is more
consistent with the X% policies actually implemented to date.5
We modeled four X% rules. The first ranked all students in public high schools
statewide by their GPAs and admitted the top 12.5%. The second ranked all students
within each school and admitted the top 12.5% from each school.6 The third rule
admitted the top 6% within each school, and the fourth admitted the top 4% within each
school. To yield an admitted group of students that represents 12.5% of graduating
public school students, the third and fourth models also accept the top 6.5% and 8.5% of
students statewide after removing the top 6% and 4% from within each school,
respectively.
The baseline rule is to attract the top 12.5% across the state. Automatically accepting the
top 4% from each school before accepting the remaining top 8.5% would not
appreciably affect the academic qualifications of admitted students overall or the
proportion of black or Hispanic students. Accepting the top 6% within each school
would likewise have little effect on diversity and academic qualifications, but it would
reduce the mean SAT of accepted black and Hispanic students appreciably relative to the
baseline, by 45 and 33 points respectively.
Table 10
Modeled Results of Top 4%, 6% and 12.5% Admission Policies
White Asian Black Hispanic Other Total
Top 12.5% Across State (Baseline)
% of Admitted Group 49 29 2 10 10
Mean SAT 1211 1222 1136 1126 1210 1204
Mean GPA 3.87 3.89 3.90 3.93 3.88 3.89
Top 4% Within HS
% of Admitted Group 49 29 2 10 10
Mean SAT 1214 1223 1117 1115 1210 1204
Mean GPA 3.88 3.90 3.87 3.93 3.88 3.89
Top 6% Within HS
% of Admitted Group 48 29 2 11 10
Mean SAT 1216 1221 1091 1093 1208 1200
Mean GPA 3.89 3.90 3.84 3.89 3.88 3.89
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Top 12.5% Within HS
% of Admitted Group 42 27 4 18 9
Mean SAT 1198 1173 1001 999 1168 1145
Mean GPA 3.87 3.88 3.60 3.68 3.85 3.83
In contrast, accepting the top 12.5% within each school would have dramatic effects
compared with the baseline condition of accepting the top 12.5% statewide. The
percentage of admitted students who are black would double, from 2% to 4%, and the
percentage of Hispanic students would increase from 10% to 18%. This increase in
diversity, however, would occur at the cost of a large drop in the academic qualifications
of admitted minority students. The mean SAT scores of black and Hispanic students
would drop 135 and 127 points, respectively, and their mean GPAs would drop by .3
and .25, respectively. The academic qualifications of the total admitted pool would drop
as well, although less markedly. The mean SAT would drop 59 points relative to the
baseline rule.
Accepting the top 12.5% within each school rather than the top 12.5% across the state to
would have similar effects on other aspects of diversity. Table 11 shows that moving
from 12.5% statewide to accepting the top 4% or 6% within schools would have little
impact on the distribution of geographic location, first language, or education level of a
student's mother. However, accepting the top 12.5% within schools increases the
representation of urban students, students who speak a language other than English at
home, and students whose mothers have limited education.
Table 11
Impact of Top X% Policies on Other Aspects of Diversity
12.5% Across
State
4% Within
School
6% Within
School
12.5% Within
School
Location
Urban .55 .56 .56 .63
Suburban .39 .38 .38 .30
Rural .06 .06 .06 .07
Home Language
English .65 .65 .64 .60
Eng. and Other
Language
.15 .15 .15 .16
Other than English .19 .19 .20 .22
Mother's Education
No HS diploma .07 .08 .09 .15
HS Diploma .12 .12 .12 .15
Some Higher Ed. .30 .30 .30 .30
College Degree .23 .23 .23 .19
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Beyond BA .23 .23 .23 .18
Missing .03 .03 .03 .03
Giving Preference to Other Aspects of Diversity
The race-neutral admission models presented above result in an over-representation of
white and Asian students. The model for highly selective schools also results in an
overrepresentation of suburban students, students who speak only English at home, and
students whose parents are highly educated. In this section, we explore the impact on
racial/ethnic composition of giving preference to students who are from low-income
families, whose mothers have little education, who attended high school in urban or
rural areas, who attended high schools with low graduation rates, or who attended high
schools in which a high percentage of students received free or reduced-price lunch.7
In each of these analyses, we awarded the equivalent of a 200-point SAT bonus to
students who came from the most disadvantaged background in terms of one of these
variables. The preference awarded for each step on a variable depended on the number
of categories the variable had. For example, in this analysis, mother's education had only
two categories (BA or beyond versus no BA), while income was broken into 14
categories (Table 12). Accordingly, while all students whose mothers lacked a BA were
given the full 200-point preference, each decrease of one step on the income variable
warranted an additional 1/14 of the total 200 points, or roughly 17 points per step.
Table 12
Variables, Number of Levels, and Preference per Step Applied in
Alternative Models
Variable Levels Effective SAT Point Boost Per Level
Income 14 16.67 per step
Mother's Education BA or Beyond 
No BA
0 
200
HS Graduation Rate >75% 
50 to 75% 
<50%
0 
100 
200
Free/Reduced Lunch Continuous, 
from 0% to 95%
2.1 for each 1 percent increase
in percent free lunch
School Location Suburban/Other 
Urban/Rural
0 
200
Table 13 displays the effect of giving preference to each variable, first individually and
then in combination. When combinations of variables were used, the maximum impact
of the combination was set to 200 points. Since school-level data were available only for
public schools, these analyses were run on a reduced data set. The first two rows of
Table 13 compare the results of the SAT and GPA-only models and show that the
reduced and full data set yielded about the same ethnic mix of admitted students.
Giving preference to students based on any of the variables decreases the representation
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of Asian students and increases that of white, black, and Hispanic students. Giving
preference to students from schools that have low graduation rates and that are located in
either urban or rural settings has the largest impact on the representation of white
students and the smallest on that of Hispanic and black students. However, giving
preference to students whose mothers are less well-educated or whose families are poor
has the largest impact on the representation of Hispanic and black students.
Perhaps most important, even the largest effects of giving preference based on
demographic variables do not come close to making the representation of black and
Hispanic students in the admitted groups proportionate to their numbers in the pool of
potential students. As Table 13 shows, even giving preference to urban and rural
students with low family incomes, whose mothers have not completed college, and who
attend high schools with low graduation rates and high free and reduced lunch rates still
results in a dramatic underrepresentation of black and Hispanic students and an
overrepresentation of white students.
Table 13
Students Admitted (%)
Modeled Variable Asian Black Hispanic White Other Decline to
state
SAT + GPA Full Sample 37.5 1.7 8.8 41.7 7.5 2.8
SAT + GPA Alt. Sample 39.9 1.8 8.3 40.0 7.5 2.4
SAT + GPA + Income 32.6 2.3 11.2 46.0 7.1 0.9
SAT + GPA + Mother's Education 30.0 2.2 11.7 47.9 7.0 1.3
SAT + GPA + Location 29.2 2.2 10.3 48.6 7.1 2.5
SAT + GPA + Graduation Rate 30.5 1.9 9.1 48.8 7.1 2.6
SAT + GPA + Free Lunch 30.6 2.1 10.2 47.4 7.0 2.5
SAT + GPA + Income + Free Lunch
+ Mother's Ed + Location
30.2 2.1 10.4 48.8 7.1 1.4
Discussion
Our analyses addressed two broad questions: what stages of the admissions process
produce the under representation of minorities, and what effects might different
admissions processes—including both a strict race-neutral policy and alternative
preferences based on variables other than race and ethnicity—have on the diversity of
the student population? Investigating these general questions shed light on several others
as well: the extent of racial/ethnic preferences in place before the end of affirmative
action, the relationships between preferences and the selectivity of campuses, and the
effects of alternative admissions policies on the characteristics of admitted students, both
minority and non-minority.
Replacing the former admissions process that included preferences with a race-neutral
model based solely on GPA and SAT scores had major effects at the two most selective
campuses in the UC system but much smaller effects at both moderate- and
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low-selectivity campuses. Kane (1998b) found a similar pattern in national data, but the
present analyses show that this pattern is maintained even within a single university
system in which some admissions criteria are common across campuses. Both black and
Hispanic populations were also noticeably underrepresented in our moderately and least
selective environments, but this under representation stemmed primarily from factors
other than the actual admissions process—in particular, whether a student decided to
take the SAT and whether the student met the minimum eligibility criteria for the UC
system. Once students passed these two hurdles, the actual admission decision had a
substantial impact on the representation of black and Hispanic students only for highly
selective campuses.
The adverse effects of a race-neutral admissions process were complex. An
under-representation of Hispanics (but not of blacks) arose because of the large
percentage of the former group who decided not to take the SAT. (Because we lacked
scores for those students, we could not estimate how many would have been admitted
had they taken the test.) Scores had an adverse impact at two stages, the UC eligibility
stage and the campus-level race-neutral admissions process. However, these effects were
in some ways duplicative, and eliminating the UC eligibility screen had little impact on
the composition of the groups admitted to highly selective campuses if the campus-level
admissions process remained unaltered. The decision to apply to selective campuses had
little impact on diversity; the race-neutral admissions model would have produced a
similar mix of students even if all students who had taken the SAT had applied.
The adverse impact of a race-neutral admissions policy was not solely the result of group
differences in scores on admissions tests. A race-neutral model based solely on GPA
also produced an under-representation of minorities, albeit a less severe one. The effects
of using GPA alone are smaller because the gap between groups in grades is smaller
than the gap in average scores. The reasons for this difference and the potential effects of
relying more on GPA, however, remain uncertain.
None of the alternative admissions models we analyzed could replicate the composition
of the student population that was in place before the termination of affirmative action in
California. Giving preference to students on the basis of other socioeconomic or
demographic variables had only modest effects on the representation of black and
Hispanic students; none that we examined brought minority students to proportional
representation. Some of these preferences, however, increased the representation of
whites at the cost of Asians. Guaranteeing admission to top students within each
school—the "X-percent rules"—would substantially increase the representation of
minority students only if the percentage within each high school guaranteed admission is
large. Of the models we examined, only admitting the top 12.5 percent of students from
each high school—in effect, basing admission to the UC system solely on rank within
high schools—led to a large increase in the representation of black and Hispanic
students. Applying the 12.5% rule, however, had a large cost: it caused a sizable drop in
both average SAT scores and average GPA, and that decline was particularly large for
black and Hispanic students. As Geiser (1998, p. 4) noted, "Redefining the UC eligibility
pool to include the top 12.5% of each school would, in short, produce a bifurcated
eligibility pool with severe academic disparities along racial/ethnic lines."
Admissions systems differ greatly, and the UC system studied has elements not shared
by many others—in particular, the dual screening, first for UC system eligibility and
subsequently for admission to a specific campus. Moreover, the effects of preferences
28 of 39
and other admissions policies depend on the characteristics of the student populations
from which universities draw. For example, the Hispanic population in Florida is unlike
that in California in several important respects, and the effects of admissions policies on
access for Hispanic students therefore could be substantially different in Florida.
Nonetheless, we expect that many of the basic conclusions we reached in examining the
California system will apply at a general level to many university systems nationwide
because group differences in prior academic performance and test scores are typically
large. The task of providing access to postsecondary education for underrepresented
minorities without frank preferences is likely to be difficult and complex throughout the
nation. Many of the alternatives will have unintended effects, such as lowering the
average level of qualification among admitted minority students. However, some
important details of the impact of alternative admissions policies will vary from one
system and population to another. Therefore, it would be prudent to examine proposed
alternatives carefully before implementation and to monitor their effects once
implemented in order to maximize their positive effects and minimize unintended
outcomes.
Notes
This research was conducted under the auspices of the National Board on Educational
Testing and Public Policy (NBETPP), and is published here with the Board's permission.
The NBETPP is located in the Lynch School of Education at Boston College and is an
independent body created to monitor assessment in American education. The NBETPP
provides research-based information for policy decision making, with special attention
to groups historically underserved by the educational system. In particular, the Board a)
monitors testing programs, policies, and products; b) evaluates the benefits and costs of
specific testing policies; and c) evaluates to what extent professional standards for test
development and use are met in specific contexts.
1
 Note that Geiser's simulation modeled a policy that differs from the actual 4% policy
implemented in California. Rather than selecting the top 4% of students from within
each high school based on their GPAs, Geiser based selection on students' combined
high school GPA and SAT scores.
2
 More precisely, the models were weighted least squares regressions of logits of
admissions probabilities on GPA and SAT. This is equivalent except in estimation
method to a logistic regression of the probability of admission on GPA and SAT. See
Appendix A.
3
 The estimates in Table 2, unlike those in Table 1, do not use the UC system-eligibility
screen. That screen is based in part on SAT scores; applying it here would therefore not
provide a clear contrast between admissions models that do and do not use SAT scores.
The estimates in Table 2 reflect only students who have taken the SAT, however, as we
have data for only those students.
4Because could not locate data that describe the distribution of all high school graduates
in terms of school location, school type, or household language use, we were compelled
to use student self-reports from the SDQ for this information. Therefore, the tables in
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this section consider no groups larger than the pool of SAT-takers and lack the
"Graduates" rows that appear in the tables in the previous section.
5Geiser calculated an "Academic Index score" using the following formula: AI =
1,000GPA + 2.5SAT. Geiser then ranked students within schools based on AI.
6
 To determine the top 12.5 % within a graduating class, we used data from the CDE to
establish the number of students who graduated and multiplied this by .125. Students
were then ranked by their GPA within schools, and the number of students representing
the top 12.5% within the graduating class were admitted. The same procedure was
repeated for the 6% and 4% models.
7These analyses roughly follow the approach Wightman (1997) took in examining the
result of giving preference to students with disadvantaged backgrounds for law school
decisions.
8Because they are simpler to interpret, we also estimated linear probability models. As
expected, however, they were problematic. In some cases, they yielded considerably
weaker fits, gave impossible estimates for some cells, and showed inappropriate
residuals.
9Values of 0 and 1 were set to .001 and .999, respectively, to calculate logits.
10In the case of Berkeley, the interactive model predicted somewhat better than the
non-interactive model, but nonetheless yielded unreasonable estimates for some cells. In
the case of Irvine and Santa Cruz, the interaction term added little to prediction.
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Appendix A
Constructing Race-Neutral Admissions Models
The baseline admission models presented in this report are intended to reflect some of
the most important characteristics of the University of California system, but it was not
possible to match that system precisely. Unlike Bowen and Bok (1998), we lacked data
from campuses on the characteristics of individual students, and we lacked important
aggregate variables separately by race, such as the probability of acceptance given SAT
scores and HSGPA. We lacked campus-level data on the characteristics of the relatively
few students admitted despite failing to meet the UC eligibility requirements ("admitted
by exception"). More important, we lacked campus-level information on the more
numerous UC-eligible students who were admitted for reasons other than only their
academic performance, variously measured. Diverse factors, including personal
disadvantage and school characteristics, can be used in deciding whether to admit these
students, who can constitute 25% to 50% of an admitted class
(http://www.ucop.edu/pathways/infoctr/introuc/select.html).
Even without this information, however, it was possible to create an approximation to
admission in the UC system as it would operate without racial preferences. The steps we
followed are presented here.
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The starting point for our baseline models was data showing the numbers of total and
accepted applicants by SAT score and HSGPA, separately by campus, for all programs
except Engineering. In the data we obtained, SAT scores were broken into five ranges,
and HSGPA was broken into six. Table A.1 shows the data we obtained for one of the
campuses; these were not further broken into racial/ethnic categories. We analyzed the
probability of admission in each cell of this matrix—that is, the ratio of the number
admitted to the total number of applicants—separately for each of the eight UC
campuses.
Table A.1
Admissions Probabilities, Berkeley 
All Programs Except Engineering, 1999
GPA SAT Composite Score  
490 -
790
800 - 990 1000 -
1190
1200 - 1390 1400 -
1600
Overall
2.82 -
2.99
149 / 10 115 / 4 16 / 0 280 / 14
6.70% 3.50% 6.70% 5.00%
3.00 -
3.29
61 / 6 288 / 23 831 / 65 730 / 48 138 / 9 2048 / 151
9.80% 8.00% 7.80% 6.60% 6.50% 7.40%
3.30 -
3.59
65 / 11 408 / 33 1336 / 94 1620 / 116 423 / 45 3852 / 299
16.90% 8.10% 7.00% 7.20% 10.60% 7.80%
3.60 -
3.89
52 / 4 421 / 57 1726 / 175 3025 / 414 830 / 259 6054 / 909
7.70% 13.50% 10.10% 13.70% 31.20% 15.00%
3.90 -
3.99
01-May 59 / 14 353 / 48 798 / 181 198 / 107 1413 / 351
20.00% 23.70% 13.60% 22.70% 54.00% 24.80%
4 21 / 5 210 / 59 1673 / 506 4775 / 2100 3179 /
2405
9858 / 5075
23.80% 28.10% 30.20% 44.00% 75.70% 51.50%
Overall 204 / 27 1386 /
186
6068 / 898 11063 /
2863
4784 /
2825
25796 /
7072
13.20% 13.40% 14.80% 25.90% 59.10% 27.40%
SOURCE: University of California, Office of the President
(www.ucop.edu/pathways/infoctr/introuc/prof_except.html).
As expected, these data show tremendous differences in the selectivity of the UC
campuses. The probability of admission to Berkeley along with UCLA, the most
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selective, is low for all applicants other than those with both high SAT scores and high
HSGPA (Figure A.1). For those with low SAT scores, only very high grades increase the
probability of admission at all. Similarly, only very high SAT scores help students with
grades as low as B (3.0), and even high scores do not increase the probability of
admission greatly.
Figure A.1. Probability of Admission to Berkeley, by SAT and GPA
Riverside presents a dramatically different picture(Figure A.2). Most students with either
high GPA or high SAT scores are admitted, and acceptance rates are above 50% for
most groups in the graph. Note that as a result, the relationship between admissions
probabilities and both SAT scores and grades is relatively weak; lines drawn between
most points in planes parallel to either the GPA or the SAT axis in Figure A.2 have
shallow slopes.
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Figure A.2. Probability of Admission to Riverside, by SAT and GPA
To estimate the probability of admission for individual students, we fit models
estimating admission probability as a function of SAT scores and GPA, separately for
each campus. Given the dichotomous outcome and the distribution of probabilities (the
number of cells with either very high or very low probability), we used logistic models
to estimate both non-interactive and interactive models. All models were weighted by
the number of applicants in each cell.8 Because all of the variables were categorical, the
logistic models could be estimated as ordinary least squares models by taking the logits
of the probabilities for each cell9:
These are equivalent to logistic probability models but are simpler to estimate. For
example, model 1 is equivalent to:
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These simple logistic models fit the data closely. The R2 values for the non-interactive
models, adjusted for shrinkage, were all greater than or equal to.79, and six of the eight
were greater than or equal to .90. The interaction added appreciably to the fit in the case
of Berkeley and UCLA but had little impact elsewhere.
Examination of the data and the models suggested that the UC campuses fell into the
following three levels of selectivity.
High selectivity. Berkeley and UCLA were clearly more selective than any of the
other campuses. Although the models for these two schools had substantially
different parameter estimates, the probabilities they predicted were very similar.
Moderate selectivity. This group includes four schools: Irvine, Davis, Santa
Barbara, and San Diego. They appeared to place somewhat different weights on
GPA and SAT scores. Irvine and San Diego showed greater effects of GPA than
did Davis and Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara and San Diego showed stronger
effects of SAT scores than did Irvine or, especially, Davis. As a group, however,
they were distinct from the high- and low-selectivity schools.
Low selectivity. Santa Cruz and Riverside appeared to be the least selective of the
eight campuses. They gave similarly little weight to low SATs; Riverside gave
less weight to low GPAs. 
These three groups are the basis for our high-, moderate-, and low-selectivity scenarios.
The high-selectivity scenario was based on the Berkeley campus. The mid-selectivity
scenario was based on the Irvine campus, and the low-selectivity scenario was based on
the Santa Cruz campus. The non-interactive logistic model was used in all cases.10
Because SAT scores and GPA are correlated in the UC data, we used separate regression
models to estimate the effects of selection models based on solely GPA or SAT rather
than both. These models were simply:
These were estimated using marginal percentages in the data tables such as Table 1.
Using data from the College Board, these models were applied to records of all
California high school seniors who took the SAT in 1995 and 1998. Students' SAT-Total
and HSGPA were used to place them in cells corresponding to the UC admissions
probability matrix, and on that basis each student was assigned a probability of
admission to a campus at each of the three levels. The models estimated logits, so the
estimated probabilities were simply the anti-logits of the model estimates, that is:
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These probabilities were multiplied by the counts in each cell and rounded to get counts
of "admitted" students. For certain purposes, the counts provided by each model were
adjusted to approximate total admissions for all of the campuses (either two or four) at
that level of selectivity, but in most cases, only the characteristics of the "admitted"
group (i.e., the percentage of admitted students who were black) were used.
A series of additional flags was created for each student in the College Board database.
The data contain no information about actual applications but do include the identities of
all schools to which students had their SAT scores sent. Students who sent scores to any
of the UC campuses were assumed to have applied to that campus. Four flags were
created in this way: sent scores to any campus; sent scores to one of the two
high-selectivity campuses; sent scores to any moderate-selectivity campus; and sent
scores to any of the two low-selectivity schools. These were treated as application flags
but may overestimate applications, presumably by a modest amount. An additional
eligibility flag was created using the UC systemwide eligibility criteria for SAT scores
and GPA. The UC requirement that SAT-II scores be submitted was not used in creating
this flag. All of these flags were set to 0 when the condition was not met and to 1 when
the condition was met.
Applying these screens and our baseline admission models in various combinations
allowed us to examine the effects of various stages of the admission process and to
simulate the effects of alternatives on the composition of the accepted group. For
example, removing the application flag provides an upper-bound estimate of the effects
of efforts to encourage all UC-eligible students to apply to all campuses; removing the
eligibility screen estimates the impact of moving to a system in which students apply
directly to UC campuses without first being filtered by a systemwide eligibility screen.
Appendix B
Comparison of Merged and Full Databases
As noted in the body of this report, data on high school characteristics were unavailable
for many of the California students for whom we had data from the College Entrance
Examination Board. When school characteristics were not needed, we used the full
database, but analyses involving any school characteristics were necessarily conducted
with a reduced database. This Appendix briefly describes the two databases.
The full database was defined as all students in the College Board database who had
valid data on GPA (variable = RECUMGPA) and SAT scores (variable = SATTOTAL).
In 1998, that selection criterion left a total of 131,406 out of 152,680 students in the
College Board California data. A key school variable obtained from the California
Department of Education (Educational Demographics Unit,
http://data1.cde.gov/dataquest) was counts of students in grade 12. We were able to
merge this variable into the records of 93,027 students who also had valid data on SAT
scores and GPA. These 93,027 students are represented in the merged database. Thus,
merging school data caused a loss of 29% of the full database.
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Although this sample loss was large, tabulations suggest that it did not materially affect
our analyses. Table B1 provides a comparison of the racial/ethnic composition of the full
and merged databases at four stages of the process of admission to the highly selective
campuses. In all cases, the percentages are similar. More important for our purposes, the
change in percentages caused by each of the filters is similar in the merged and full
databases. The conclusions presented in the paper would not differ greatly if one of these
databases were substituted for the other.
Table B1
Racial/Ethnic Composition, Merged and Full Databases
Model Based on SAT+GPA (Row Percents)
 Asian,
Pacific 
Islander
Black or
African-American
Hispanic White Other Decline
to State
Merged Data
SAT-takers, 1998 24.2 6.6 19.5 40.2 5.6 2.8
UC eligible, 1998 27.4 3.5 15.3 44.6 5.9 2.4
Eligible and 
applied to high
selectivity schools, 
1998
38.4 3.5 14.7 33.9 6.7 2.1
Admitted by 
neutral model,
1998
39.9 1.8 8.3 40.0 6.9 2.4
Full Database Without Merge
SAT-takers, 1998 22.4 6.6 19.0 41.9 5.8 3.2
UC eligible, 1998 25.3 3.6 15.1 46.1 6.2 2.9
Eligible and 
applied to high
selectivity schools, 
1998
36.0 3.7 14.8 35.4 6.9 2.4
Admitted by 
neutral model,
1998
37.5 1.7 8.8 41.7 7.0 2.8
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